Characterizing Truthful Market Design

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Characterizing Truthful Market Design
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful double-sided auctions was made. This paper characterizes truthful mechanisms for double-sided auctions by generalizing Roberts classic result [29], to show that truthful double-sided auctions must ”almost” be affine maximizers. Our main result of characterizing double-sided auctions required the creation of a new set of tools, reductions that preserve economic properties. This paper utilizes two such reductions; a truth-preserving reduction and a non-affine preserving reduction. The truthpreserving reduction is used to reduce the double-sided auction to a special case of a combinatorial auction to make use of the impossibility result proved in [20]. Intuitively, our proof shows that truthful double-sided auctions are as hard to design as truthful combinatorial auctions. Two important concepts are developed i...
Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where WINE
Authors Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
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