A prior-free revenue maximizing auction for secondary spectrum access

11 years 6 months ago
A prior-free revenue maximizing auction for secondary spectrum access
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary users, on a short-term basis. Primary users may need financial motivations to share spectrum, since they assume costs in obtaining spectrum licenses. Auctions are a natural revenue generating mechanism to apply. Recent design on spectrum auctions make the strong assumption that the primary user knows the probability distribution of user valuations. We study revenue-maximizing spectrum auctions in the more realistic priorfree setting, when information on user valuations is unavailable. A two-phase auction framework is constructed. In phase one, we design a strategyproof mechanism that computes a subset of users with an interference-free spectrum allocation, such that the potential revenue in the second phase is maximized. A tailored payment scheme ensures truthful bidding at this stage. The selected users the...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li
Added 30 Aug 2011
Updated 30 Aug 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Authors Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li
Comments (0)