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149 search results - page 1 / 30 » On Mechanism Design without Payments for Throughput Maximiza... |
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
13 years 12 days ago
2009
IEEE
—It is well-known that the overall efficiency of a distributed system can suffer if the participating entities seek to maximize their individual performance. Consequently, mecha...
WINE
2009
Springer
13 years 10 days ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
ATAL
2010
Springer
12 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
ATAL
2004
Springer
12 years 11 months ago
2004
Springer
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 8 days ago
2009
ACM
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
